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Abstract: 
 
Theory of mind competence and knowledge of emotions were studied longitudinally in a sample 
of preschoolers aged 3 (n=263) and 4 (n=244) years. Children were assessed using standard 
measures of theory of mind and emotion knowledge. Three competing hypotheses were tested 
regarding the developmental associations between children's theory of mind abilities and their 
knowledge of emotions. First, that an understanding of emotion develops early and informs 
children's understanding of others’ thinking. Alternatively, having a basic theory of mind may 
help children learn about emotions. Third, that the two domains are separate aspects of children's 
social cognitive skills such that each area develops independently. Results of hierarchical 
regressions supported the first hypothesis that early emotion understanding predicts later theory-
of-mind performance, and not the reverse. 
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Article: 
The domain of children's social understanding, including understanding of one's own and others’ 
minds and emotions, has been the topic of much research over the past few decades. Social 
understanding is related to positive social skills and peer relationships, and the lack of such 
understanding is implicated in the development of problem behaviours (Dunn, 2000; Hughes, 
Dunn, & White, 1998; Weimer & Guajardo, 2005). To date, however, although an impressive 
volume of literature has been devoted to understanding children's developing understanding of 
their own and others’ mental states (see Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wellman & 
Liu, 2004, for reviews) and their understanding of emotions (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; 
Denham, 1986; Denham & Couchoud, 1990; Dunn, 2000; Hughes & Dunn, 1998), it is unclear 
how children's theory of mind competence and their knowledge of emotions are associated 
longitudinally. It has been suggested that an understanding of emotion comes “on line” early 
during development and informs children's understanding of others’ thinking (Dunn, 2000). An 
alternative viewpoint holds that having a basic understanding of others’ minds help children 
learn about emotions (Harwood & Farrar, 2006). A third possibility, suggested by Cutting and 
Dunn (1999), is that the two domains are separate aspects of children's developing social 
cognitive skills such that each area develops somewhat independently. Knowing more about the 
longitudinal relations between emotion understanding and theory of mind has implications for 
both basic research and intervention efforts aimed at promoting social competence and reducing 
behaviour problems (Izard et al., 2008). The present study examined children's performance on 
emotion-understanding and theory-of-mind tasks at two time points during the preschool years to 
test competing ideas about the development of these skills. 
Several authors have discussed longitudinal relations between emotion understanding and theory 
of mind development, in both empirical and review pieces (Bartsch & Estes, 1996; Dunn, 2000; 
Hughes & Dunn, 1998; LaBounty, Wellman, Olson, Lagattuta, & Liu, 2008). However, there 
remains a lack of clear empirical evidence using a large, diverse sample on how the two 
constructs are related over time in development. 
One possibility is that emotion understanding emerges first and supports the development of 
theory of mind. Evidence from Bartsch and Wellman (1995) indicates that very young children 
use desire and emotion terms by age 2 and only later talk about beliefs. Such a progression, 
according to the authors, suggests that it is through social interactions that children come to learn 
how beliefs influence people's behaviour. Dunn (2000) has suggested that children first 
understand emotional states and then extend that understanding to cognitive states. More 
specifically, because emotions are typically displayed outwardly and mental states are not, 
children may be able to recognise where their own and others’ feelings differ more readily than 
they can recognise that their own mental state differs from another's. Situations in which another 
person's expressed emotion is unexpected to a child or in conflict with his or her own feelings 
may help children understand that other people can think differently about the same event, 
contributing to a developing understanding of others’ mental states. Several lines of research 
support this hypothesis. For example, it has been observed that emotion understanding emerges 
earlier in the preschool years than theory of mind, as measured by false-belief tasks (Dunn, 
Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991). Further, Hughes and Dunn (1998) found that 
affective perspective-taking tasks at age 4 predicted a composite of theory-of-mind performance 
at age 5, controlling for age, verbal ability, nonverbal ability, and age 4 theory of mind. 
An alternative longitudinal hypothesis is that children need to develop an understanding of mind 
in order to identify others’ emotional states. It may be that children must first recognise that 
others may have beliefs and desires that are different from their own in order to understand the 
motivations behind emotions. To the extent that children must take another person's beliefs or 
desires into account in predicting that person's feelings about a situation, theory of mind skill 
could be basic to an understanding of emotions beyond simple labelling. This idea has not been 
directly tested empirically. Hughes and Dunn (1998) were unable to examine the longitudinal 
relation between theory of mind and emotion understanding because by age 5 the children in 
their study had reached ceiling on the emotion-understanding task they used. Harwood and 
Farrar (2006) suggested that affective perspective-taking performance, particularly the 
identification of emotions in others that differ from one's own feelings, depends upon the skills 
inherent in theory-of-mind tasks. In support of their idea, they found a significant correlation 
between theory-of-mind performance and performance on the affective perspective-taking tasks. 
Because their study was cross-sectional, however, this hypothesis still needs to be tested 
empirically using a longitudinal design. In two samples of children ages 4 to 6 who were given 
false-belief tasks, de Rosnay, Pons, Harris, and Morrell (2004) found that children were better 
able to predict actions than emotions of the story characters. They concluded that there was a lag 
between children's understanding of false belief and their ability to attribute emotions accurately. 
Again, however, these studies were cross-sectional in design, leaving open the question of the 
longitudinal link between theory of mind and emotion understanding. 
A third possibility is that children's understanding of minds and of emotions develop in parallel; 
that is, the two areas of knowledge may be somewhat independent of each other. Skills may 
develop at approximately the same time in development but not be related in any causal way. 
Support for independent development of emotion understanding and theory of mind comes from 
studies in which children's performance on the two types of tasks is uncorrelated. For example, 
in a study of 3- to 5-year-old children, Cutting and Dunn (1999) found that neither emotion 
understanding nor false belief contributed independently to the other after accounting for age, 
family background characteristics, and language ability. The authors concluded that emotion 
understanding and false belief may be related but distinct aspects of social cognition, perhaps 
following different developmental paths. Similar findings have been reported by other 
investigators (Dunn et al., 1991; LaBounty et al., 2008; Racine, Carpendale, & Turnbull, 2007; 
Weimer & Guajairdo, 2005), although Hughes and Dunn (1998) found the two types of tasks to 
be significantly correlated in children tested at three time points between age 4 and age 5, and 
Harwood and Farrar (2006) reported a significant relation between 3- to 5-year-old children's 
theory-of-mind performance and a task requiring understanding of another's emotions as 
different from one's own. 
The inconsistent findings across different studies may in fact be related to different rates of 
development in the two domains. If, for example, children's emotion understanding develops 
earlier than theory-of-mind understanding, it would be expected that at very young ages, emotion 
understanding and theory of mind would be uncorrelated, but that as theory of mind develops, 
the two would be more highly correlated at later ages. Many prior studies have used small 
samples of children, however, and have often included children of varying ages, making it 
difficult to identify developmental patterns. 
The goal of the present study was to examine, using a relatively large, economically diverse 
sample of children, the developmental associations between the domains of emotion 
understanding and theory of mind, including tests of how each may be related to the other 
longitudinally. Because most children are able to participate in false-belief and emotion-
understanding tasks at age 3, acquire aspects of theory of mind by age 4, but tend to reach ceiling 
on some of the standard emotion-understanding tasks by age 5, an examination of children's 
performance from age 3 to 4 was expected to be particularly insightful in providing evidence 
regarding the developmental sequences at the point of emergence of skills in emotion 
understanding and theory of mind. Within each domain, tasks were selected to tap a range of 
skill levels. We tested three possibilities: (1) that emotion understanding precedes and 
contributes to the early development of theory of mind, in which case we would expect age 3 
emotion understanding to be associated with age 4 theory of mind but not the reverse; (2) that 
theory of mind precedes and contributes to the early development of emotion understanding, in 
which case we would expect age 3 theory-of-mind performance to predict age 4 emotion 
understanding but not the reverse; and (3) that the early development of emotion understanding 
and theory of mind occurs independently, in which case we would expect within- and across-age 
relations between the two types of measures to be similar. 
Method 
Participants 
Participating families were part of a short-term longitudinal study examining emotional and 
cognitive contributions to early school success. Children and mothers came to the study site 
when children were 3 years old (N=263; child age M=41.79 months; SD=2.41) and again one 
year later (N=244; M=53.41 months; SD=1.84). Mothers in the study sample were 33 years of 
age on average (SD=5.91). Approximately half of the sample (49%) had less than a 4-year 
college degree; at the time of entry into the study, 74% of the respondents were married and 
living with their partner, and 79% were working outside the home. Average income-to-needs 
ratio at the first visit, derived by dividing the total family income by the poverty threshold for 
that family size, was 2.89 (SD=1.73). Approximately 37% of the sample had an income-to-needs 
ratio under 2.0, indicating low income; 53% were between 2 and 5; and 10% were greater than 5. 
Of the children, 52% were female; 58% were European American, 35% African American, and 
7% other ethnicities, including children of mixed ethnicity. 
The retention from age 3 to age 4 was high (93%) with few significant differences between 
families that participated in both waves of data versus those who did not. Mothers whose 
children participated in both visits were older, t(261) = 2.36, p<.05, more likely to be European 
American, χ2(1, N=263) = 5.13, p<.05, and better educated, t(261) = 2.43,p<.05, than those lost 
to follow-up. There were no differences between the two groups in child age, child sex, or scores 
on the study measures at age 3. 
Procedure 
Participating families were recruited from preschools and child-care centres in a small south-
eastern city of the USA through letters sent home with 3-year-old children. Families interested in 
participating returned contact information to the researchers who then called the families to 
schedule a laboratory visit that lasted approximately 2 hours; a second visit was conducted 
approximately 12 months later. During each visit, children were videotaped while completing a 
variety of tasks assessing emotional and cognitive development, with task order held constant 
across children. Mothers provided written consent and completed questionnaires during the 
session. Families received $40 for the first visit and $60 for the second; children selected a toy as 
thanks for their participation. 
Measures 
Demographics 
Mothers completed a demographic questionnaire at each visit including information about child 
age, child sex, ethnicity, and family characteristics. 
Emotion understanding 
Three increasingly sophisticated aspects of children's understanding of their own and others’ 
emotions were assessed at both visits, using the procedures developed by Denham (1986); 
Denham, Zoller, & Couchoud, 1994): labelling of facial expressions, affective perspective taking 
(including both non-equivocal and equivocal situations), and understanding emotion causes. 
Emotion labelling 
Following Denham (1986), children were presented four felt faces, drawn to depict the emotions 
happy, sad, angry, and scared, and asked to name each expression (e.g., “How is this person 
feeling right now?”) to assess accuracy of verbal emotion labelling. Children were also asked to 
point to each expression when requested (e.g., “Show me the _______ face.”) to assess 
recognition of emotional expressions. For each emotion, children received a score of 2 if they 
identified the correct emotion, 1 if they identified an incorrect emotion of the correct valence 
(e.g., sad instead of angry), and 0 if they identified an emotion of the incorrect valence (e.g., 
happy instead of sad). Recognition and labelling scores correlated at age 3, r(261)=.62, p<.01, 
and at age 4, r(244)=.42, p<.01, and were summed to create one total score of emotion labelling. 
At age 3, 1% of children scored 0 and 5% scored the maximum of 16. At age 4, no children 
scored 0 and 24% scored 16. 
Affective perspective taking (APT) 
The vignettes of emotion-eliciting situations developed by Denham (1986) were used to assess 
children's understanding of others’ emotions. Vignettes were presented as puppet tasks; the 
children were asked to indicate how the puppet felt by affixing a felt face depicting happiness, 
sadness, anger or fear to the puppet. The first four vignettes involved situations that evoke non-
equivocal emotional reactions (e.g., happiness at getting an ice cream cone). The remaining six 
vignettes were more equivocal situations in which the protagonist puppet portrayed an emotional 
response that the mother reported as atypical for her child. (Mothers provided information about 
children's typical emotional reactions at the beginning of the laboratory session.) For example, if 
a mother indicated that her child would feel scared about being approached by a large, friendly 
dog, the puppet enacted happiness using standardised verbal and visual cues. For each vignette, 
children received a 0, 1, or 2 for the face they selected using the same criteria as the labelling of 
emotions scoring described above. Scores were calculated for non-equivocal (possible range 0 to 
8) and equivocal affective perspective taking (possible range 0 to 12) by summing scores across 
the appropriate vignettes. At age 3, 2% of children scored 0 and 17% at ceiling on the non-
equivocal task. For equivocal, 2% scored 0 and 2% scored the maximum of 12. At age 4, 1% 
scored 0 and 58% scored 8 for non-equivocal. For equivocal, 0% scored 0 and 17% scored 12. 
The two measures correlated significantly at age 3,r(258)=.53, p<.01, and at age 
4, r(244)=.43, p<.01. Because earlier research has found these two subscales correlate differently 
with other measures of theory of mind (Harwood & Farrar, 2006), we retained the two separate 
scores. 
Understanding emotion causes 
Children's ability to explain the reasons for experiencing emotions was examined using a puppet 
task developed by Denham et al. (1994). One of four emotion faces was placed on a puppet and 
children were asked to identify the emotion. Then the examiner asked, “What made the puppet 
feel this way?” Children were encouraged to report as many as four possible reasons, and their 
responses were recorded verbatim and coded for the number of accurate, independent causes 
given (possible range 0 to 4) for each of the four emotions. A response was not considered valid 
if it was a description of the emotion, an action that would be taken as a result of the feeling, or if 
the response did not make sense for the context. Repetitive answers or answers from the same 
category (e.g., monsters and dragons are both considered big, scary creatures) were coded as one 
cause. Accuracy was defined using criteria established in past research (Barrett & Campos, 1987; 
Stein & Jewett, 1986; e.g., correct causes of anger involve goal blockage). The inter-observer 
agreement on the codes, calculated as agreements divided by agreements plus disagreements, 
was 85.5% at age 3 and 93% at age 4. The number of correct explanations was summed across 
all four emotions. At age 3, 12% of children scored 0 and no children reached ceiling on the task. 
At age 4, 4% of children scored 0 and again, no children scored the maximum total points. 
Theory of mind 
Children's knowledge of their own and others’ mental processes was measured using four tasks 
that varied in complexity (see Holmes, Black, & Miller, 1996; Wellman & Liu, 2004, for 
developmental sequences of theory-of-mind tasks): an unexpected location task in which the 
child was active in creating the deception; an unexpected-contents task; an appearance–reality 
distinction task; and a conceptual perspective-taking task. All tasks were administered at both 
time points. 
Unexpected location (UL) 
The unexpected location task, adapted from Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985) and Hala and 
Chandler (1996), involved asking the child to predict a person's behaviour that is based on a 
mistaken belief about the location of a hidden object. The experimenter showed the child three 
boxes. A second experimenter then entered the room and placed a toy in one of the three boxes. 
Experimenter 2 (E2) then left the room and the child was asked to move the object from one box 
to another while Experimenter 2 was out of the room. Two trials were presented and for each 
trial the child was asked two questions: “Where will E2 look for the toy when he comes back?” 
and “Where will E2 think the toy is?” Children received a score of 1 for each correct judgement 
of a false belief. The number of correct responses was summed to yield a total score 
for unexpected location that could range from 0 to 4. At age 3, 50% of children scored 0 and 4% 
scored the maximum of 4. At age 4, 19% of children scored 0 and 34% scored 4. 
Unexpected contents (UC) 
This task, developed by Astington and Gopnik (1988), assessed children's false-belief reasoning 
by asking them to identify their own and another character's belief about the contents of two 
containers. At 3 years, children were shown a band-aid box that contained blocks and a crayon 
box that contained spoons, and at 4 years children were shown a cereal box containing pencils 
and a bubble jar containing straws. First, the examiner presented the box and asked the child, 
“What do you think is in here?” The examiner then revealed the actual contents and asked, 
“Before we opened this, what did you think was in here?” Then, the examiner asked the child 
what a friend, who had not seen the actual contents of the box, would think was inside. Children 
earned a score of 1 for each correct answer summed across both trials (i.e., possible scores range 
from 0–4). At age 3, 44% of children scored 0 and 8% scored the maximum of 4. At age 4, 36% 
of children scored 0 and 23% scored 4. 
Appearance–reality distinction (ART) 
This task, developed by Flavell, Flavell, and Green (1983), assesses whether children can 
accurately describe differences between an object's real nature and its apparent nature when 
modified perceptually. Children were shown two realistic-looking imitation objects: a candle in 
the shape of an apple and an egg made of wood at age 3 and a pencil sharpener in the shape of a 
light bulb and an eraser in the shape of a crayon at age 4. Then the colour was modified by 
placing a sheet of blue tinted plastic in front of each of the objects, and the size was modified by 
using a large magnifying lens. Children were asked a series of questions about what the object 
looked like while modified (e.g., “Does it look blue or red?”, “Does it look like an apple or a 
candle?”, and “Does it look big or does it look little?”) and what the properties of the 
object really were (e.g., “Is it really, really blue or is it really, really red?”, “Is it really, really an 
apple or is it really, really a candle?”, and “Is it really, really big, or is it really, really little?”). 
Children received a score of 1 for each correct answer for each of these questions. The number of 
correct responses was summed separately across colour, object, and size domains: appearance 
reality colour; appearance reality object; and appearance reality size, to yield two scores each 
ranging from 0 to 4. A total sum score was computed for appearance reality distinction. At age 3, 
1% of children scored 0 and 1% scored the maximum of 12. At age 4, 1% of children scored 0 
and 5% scored 12. 
Conceptual perspective taking (CPT) 
The conceptual perspective-taking task is a theory-of-mind task that measures whether the child 
is able to take the perspective of others (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981; Taylor, 1988). 
Tasks are organised hierarchically into Level 1 tasks, in which children need only recognise that 
another person cannot always see the same things they can see, and Level 2 tasks, which require 
children to differentiate their own viewpoint about the same stimulus from the viewpoint of 
another person. At each lab visit, children were first presented with three Level 2 tasks in which 
two different pictures and a book were placed on the table in front of the child one at a time, 
alternating whether they were right-side-up to the child or to the experimenter. Children were 
asked two questions about the pictures that required them to consider the perspective of the 
experimenter (e.g., “What about me? When I look at the turtle, do I see the turtle standing on his 
feet or lying on his back?”). Following these tasks, one Level 1 task was administered in which 
children were shown a card with a different picture on each side. The card was then placed 
vertically between the child and the experimenter so that each could see the picture on only one 
side, and children were asked what the experimenter could see. The total conceptual perspective-
taking score was the number of correct responses (range 0–7). At age 3, 6% of children scored 0 
and 4% reached ceiling. At age 4, 5% of children scored 0 and 17% scored 7. 
Language assessment 
At each lab visit, children were administered the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT; Dunn 
& Dunn, 1997a,1997b). Standard scores derived from this measure at age 3 were used in all 
analyses to control for language ability, as language skills have been shown to be associated with 
both emotion understanding and theory-of-mind development (Cutting & Dunn, 1999). 
Results 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to examine the frequencies and distributions of study 
variables. Means, standard deviations, and ranges at 3 years and 4 years are displayed in Table 
1 along with mean comparisons and correlations across the two ages. As expected, children's 
performance on all tasks improved significantly over one year, indicating developmental change 
in children's understanding of emotional and cognitive states from age 3 to age 4. Correlations 
from age 3 to age 4, an index of the stability of individual differences on tasks, were significant 
for all tasks except conceptual perspective taking. 
Table 1. Descriptive data for study variables 
  Time 1(3 years) Time 2 (4 years)     
  M SD Range M SD Range r t 
Emotion understanding                 
Labelling of emotions 11.84 3.40 0–16 14.40 1.75 5–16 .51** 13.23** 
Affective perspective taking 
non-equivocal 
5.07 2.11 0–8 7.04 1.56 1–8 .26** 13.90** 
Affective perspective taking 
equivocal 
7.10 2.90 0–12 9.72 2.16 2–12 .31** 13.91** 
Knowledge of emotion causes 3.46 2.73 0–12 6.80 3.76 0–15 .51** 15.36** 
                  
Theory of mind                 
Unexpected location 0.85 1.09 0–4 2.32 1.55 0–4 .19** 13.05** 
Unexpected contents 1.12 1.28 0–4 1.70 1.64 0–4 .21** 5.10** 
Appearance reality distinction 6.10 1.59 0–12 7.75 2.26 1–12 .30** 10.92** 
Conceptual perspective taking 2.85 1.63 0–7 3.81 2.18 0–7 .09 5.69** 
Note: **p<.01. 
 
Additionally, Table 2 shows the zero-order correlations between all the tasks at age 3 (above the 
diagonal) and at age 4 (below the diagonal). The correlations within the four emotion-
understanding tasks are fairly consistent across the two ages, but the theory-of-mind tasks tend to 
correlate more highly at age 4 than at age 3. Also, the correlations across domains are somewhat 
higher and more consistent at age 4. 
Table 2. Correlations between emotion-understanding and theory-of-mind tasks at Time 1 (3 
years) and Time 2 (4 years) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Labelling of emotions — .41** .47** .48** .11 .04 .30** -.01 
2. APT non-equivocal .37** — .53** .38** .12 .09 .25** .01 
3. APT equivocal .37** .42** — .41** .16** .06 .19** -.02 
4. Emotion causes .30** .34** .28** — .15* .09 .33** .05 
5. Unexpected location .25** .27** .23** .31** — .21** .20** .03 
6. Unexpected contents .13* .16* .22** .12 .37** — .17** .07 
7. Appearance reality .20** .35** .19** .31** .43** .40** — .11 
8. Conceptual 
perspective taking 
.19** .18** .08 .11 .31** .37** .25** — 
Note: Correlations above the diagonal are Time 1 (age 3) variables. Correlations below the diagonal are 
Time 2 (age 4) variables. Correlations across domains are shown in bold. *p<.05; **p<.01. 
Covariates 
The relations between emotion-understanding tasks, theory-of-mind tasks, and demographic 
characteristics were examined to identify covariates. Initial correlations indicated that child 
ethnicity (dichotomised), gender, PPVT score, and family income-to-needs were consistently 
associated with both emotion-understanding and theory-of-mind scores, and thus these 
demographic variables were retained as controls. In addition, performance on the same task at 
age 3 was controlled to provide a stringent test of the effect of earlier acquisition of emotion 
understanding or theory of mind on growth in the other domain across a year. 
Does emotion understanding predict change in theory of mind? 
Four hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted to examine whether performance 
on the emotion-understanding tasks at age 3 predicts change in each of the theory-of-mind tasks 
between age 3 and age 4. Child ethnicity, gender, PPVT score, and family income-to-needs at 
age 3 were entered first as control variables. In the next block, 3-year performance on the task 
under consideration was entered. The set of emotion-understanding tasks at age 3 was entered as 
the final block. Results are shown in Table 3. The block of 3-year emotion-understanding tasks 
was a significant predictor of change for three of the four theory-of-mind tasks: unexpected 
contents, conceptual perspective taking and appearance–reality distinction. The exception was 
the unexpected location task. An examination of the individual emotion-understanding tasks 
indicated that the equivocal subscale of the affective perspective-taking task at age 3 predicted 
change in children's performance on both the unexpected-contents task and the appearance–
reality task from age 3 to age 4 above and beyond the other emotion-understanding tasks. 
Labelling of emotions predicted change in children's performance on the conceptual perspective-
taking task above and beyond the other emotion-understanding tasks. 
Table 3. Hierarchical regressions predicting theory-of-mind tasks at Time 2 (4 years) from 
emotion-understanding tasks at Time 1 (3 years) 
 
Unexpected contents Unexpected location Conceptual perspective taking Appearance reality 
Variable ΔR 2 B 
SE 
B β ΔR 2 B 
SE 
B β ΔR 2 B 
SE 
B β ΔR 2 B 
SE 
B β 
Block 1 .10**       .17**       .05*       .17**       
Child 
ethnicity 
  0.05 0.22 0.02   0.24 0.20 0.08   0.56 0.31 0.13   0.16 0.28 0.03 
Child 
gender 
  –
0.06 
0.20 –0.02   –
0.08 
0.19 –0.03   0.34 0.28 0.08   –
0.18 
0.27 –0.04 
PPVT score   0.01 0.01 0.06   0.03 0.01 0.28*   –
0.01 
0.01 –0.03   0.03 0.01 0.20* 
Family 
income-to-
needs ratio 
  0.12 0.06 0.13*   0.07 0.06 0.08   0.01 0.08 0.00   0.10 0.08 0.08 
Block 2 .03*       .01       .00       .02*       
 
Unexpected contents Unexpected location Conceptual perspective taking Appearance reality 
Variable ΔR 2 B 
SE 
B β ΔR 2 B 
SE 
B β ΔR 2 B 
SE 
B β ΔR 2 B 
SE 
B β 
Age 3 
theory-of-
mind task 
performance 
  0.21 0.08 0.16*   0.15 0.09 0.11   0.11 0.09 0.08   0.15 0.09 0.10 
Block 3 .04*       .01       .04*       .05*       
Labelling of 
emotions 
  0.03 0.04 0.06   –
0.02 
0.04 –0.04   0.12 0.06 0.17*   –
0.04 
0.06 –0.05 
APT non-
equivocal 
  –
0.01 
0.06 –0.02   0.06 0.05 0.07   0.15 0.08 0.14   0.05 0.08 0.05 
APT 
equivocal 
  0.09 0.04 0.16*   0.03 0.04 0.06   –
0.00 
0.06 –0.01   0.14 0.06 0.18* 
Emotion 
causes 
  0.06 0.05 0.10   0.01 0.04 0.02   0.01 0.06 0.01   0.09 0.06 0.12 
Overall 
adjusted R 2 
.12       .16       .06       .21       
Overall F 4.723 
(9, 
227)** 
      6.03 
(9, 
227)** 
      2.71 
(9, 
226)** 
      7.83 
(9, 
227)** 
      
Note: Results from the final block of hierarchical regressions reported. *p < .05; **p < .01. 
Does theory of mind predict change in emotion understanding? 
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were also used to examine whether theory of mind at 
age 3 predicts change in emotion understanding between age 3 and 4. Again, child ethnicity, 
gender, PPVT score, and family income-to-needs at age 3 were included as controls in block 1, 
and the 3-year emotion-understanding score under consideration was entered in block 2. All four 
theory-of-mind tasks from the 3-year assessment were entered as a final block. The block of 
theory-of-mind tasks was not significant for labelling of emotions, ΔR 2=.01, ΔF(4, 227) = 
0.36, p=.84, the non-equivocal subscale of the affective perspective taking measure, ΔR 2=.03, 
ΔF(4, 227) = 2.25, p=.07, the equivocal subscale, ΔR 2=.01, ΔF(4, 226) = 0.82, p=.51, or 
emotion causes, ΔR 2=.02, ΔF(4, 227) = 1.26, p=.29. 
Discussion 
The goal of this study was to examine the longitudinal relation between emotion understanding 
and theory of mind in children from age 3 to age 4. Our primary finding is that emotion 
understanding at age 3 predicts change in theory-of-mind task performance from age 3 to age 4, 
but age 3 theory-of-mind understanding does not predict change in emotion understanding across 
the same age period. Earlier work by Hughes and Dunn (1998) also found a developmental link 
between emotion understanding and theory of mind, but they were unable to test the reverse due 
to ceiling effects on emotion labelling. In addition, Harwood and Farrar (2006) found that 3- to 
5-year-old children were able to perform better on an affective perspective-taking task than on 
theory-of-mind tasks. 
In general, it was the entire set of emotion-understanding tasks rather than specific tasks that 
were significant predictors of theory-of-mind development. Within the set of tasks, the equivocal 
questions of the affective perspective-taking task uniquely predicted children's performance on 
the unexpected-contents task and the appearance–reality task. These results support and extend 
those observed by Harwood and Farrar (2006) among 3- to 5-year-old children in which they 
observed a relationship between the equivocal portion of the APT task and children's theory-of-
mind performance. This relationship was not observed in their sample for the non-equivocal 
portion of the APT. The current study extends this work by looking at the relationship among 
children's performance on similar tasks longitudinally. Specifically, findings from the current 
study indicate that an initial appreciation of conflicting situations in the context of emotions may 
aid children developmentally in grasping that others’ mental perspectives may differ from their 
own. 
Additionally, children's ability to correctly recognise and label emotions uniquely predicted 
performance on the conceptual perspective task. Although it is not apparent why an ability to 
label emotions would be related to the ability to take another's visual perspective, it may be that 
labelling emotions is a basic ability indicative of a child's skill and tendency to cue into social 
interactions, including recognising emotional messages from others, which in turn gives them an 
advantage in understanding that others may have differing perspectives from their own. 
These results suggest that children understand emotions prior to understanding mental states and 
that children with more sophisticated and earlier-emerging understanding of emotions will more 
readily acquire an understanding of false belief. It may be that emotions are easier for children to 
identify than mental states (Bartsch & Estes,1996; Dunn, 2000). Emotions are typically 
accompanied by internal physiological changes and outward facial expressions that are common 
across individuals. Although mental states may at times involve physiological or facial 
expression changes, such as increased arousal and a knitted brow when a person is thinking 
deeply, these potentially observable aspects are more subtle and less uniform across people and 
situations than the outward expression of emotions. 
It may also be that those children who are aware of their own and others’ emotions are more alert 
to social cues and more likely to notice discrepancies between their own and others’ experiences, 
which may contribute to a growing understanding of the beliefs and desires that motivate others’ 
actions. This notion is supported by work finding that very young children explain people's 
actions first in terms of emotions and desires and only later incorporate the idea of belief as an 
explanation (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). Children who demonstrate an awareness of emotional 
states in themselves and others may elicit more discussion of all kinds of mental states from 
parents and other adults, which would in turn contribute to theory-of-mind understanding 
(Racine et al., 2007; Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002). 
It is important to recognise that the results of the present study describe only the early emergence 
of theory of mind and emotion understanding skills. Other researchers, using samples of slightly 
older children, have reported findings suggesting that some aspects of false-belief understanding 
precede and contribute to emotion understanding. De Rosnay et al. (2004), for example, found 
that 4- to 6-year-old children were more accurate in predicting how another person 
would act than in predicting how that person would feel; they suggested that children need to 
acquire an understanding of belief prior to making accurate attributions of emotions to others. 
Similarly, Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, and Cooke (1989), in an experimental study, found 
that preschool-aged children predicted others’ emotional reactions using concepts of belief and 
desire. Both de Rosnay et al. and Harris et al. used more complex reasoning tasks than those used 
in the present research and examined older children. Because the analyses in the present study 
cover only the time period between age 3 and age 4, we could not examine the potential 
transactional relations between the two types of tasks. A longer term longitudinal examination of 
the interplay between emotion understanding and theory-of-mind understanding is warranted to 
address this question. 
Consistent with studies looking at the development of children's emotion understanding and 
theory of mind, children varied over this time period in their ability to master the tasks (Holmes 
et al., 1996; Pons & Harris, 2005; Wellman & Liu, 2004). Although one concern in prior 
research has been the issue of a majority of children reaching ceiling on particular tasks, this did 
not occur in the present study. The range of scores we observed indicates that the tasks were 
appropriate for children at these ages and tap real differences between individual children. Our 
goal was to examine the early emergence of these skills, and the 3- to 4-year time period appears 
to be the earliest age at which children can demonstrate their understanding, but not be at 
mastery. Despite the range of difficulty of tasks used in the present study, they still represent 
only basic aspects of emotion understanding and theory of mind. As noted above, different 
relations across domains may be found with a wider range of tasks and at older ages. 
Additionally, in the present study, as has been found in past research, at both age 3 and age 4, 
children's performance on emotion-understanding tasks was generally higher than their 
performance on theory-of-mind tasks. Emotions have outward manifestations that are consistent 
within a culture, and therefore even young children have many opportunities to perceive the 
similarities between internal feeling states and facial expressions. Additionally, parents and other 
adults may be more likely to refer to emotions than to beliefs, thoughts, or ideas when talking 
with young children (LaBounty et al., 2008), thus helping children learn the labels for emotional 
states and map emotions onto situations. Conversations about cognitive states are likely to 
describe one's own thoughts (“I think it's time to go home”, or “I wish it weren't raining”) or ask 
about another's thoughts (“What do you think?”) rather than explaining the complexities of 
situations in which two people think differently about a single event. Thus, children may more 
frequently be exposed to direct teaching about emotional states than about false belief and its 
consequences. Still, in the present sample, there was considerable variation in performance on 
both types of tasks. Some 3-year-old children were quite competent at the theory-of-mind tasks 
and some were not; some did very well on the emotion-understanding tasks and some did not. 
We also found that emotion-understanding and theory-of-mind task performance tended to be 
more consistently correlated at age 4 than at age 3. This suggests the possibility of a growing 
integration across these skills. Such an integration was proposed by Cutting and Dunn (1999), 
who saw the two types of abilities as related but distinguishable aspects of emerging social 
cognition. Further longitudinal work using more complex tasks would be of interest in learning 
more about children's social cognitive development. 
The present study has a number of strengths and some limitations. The strengths include its 
relatively large and diverse sample of children, in contrast to much of the research in this area 
that has included primarily children from middle-class and advantaged families. Unlike Cutting 
and Dunn (1999), however, we did not find that family background variables used as controls 
(family income and ethnicity) were consistent predictors of children's performance on either 
emotion-understanding or theory-of-mind tasks. A second strength is the longitudinal design of 
the study, as we were able to administer the same tasks across two age points in the preschool 
period. This design allowed us to examine change from age 3 to age 4 in the emotion-
understanding and theory-of-mind tasks. The tasks used in the present study included a range of 
different kinds of skills in both areas and were those most commonly used in studies of young 
children's emotion understanding and theory of mind. Use of these tasks allows comparison with 
prior studies and builds on an already existing base of knowledge. Nevertheless, it is possible 
that different results would have been obtained had different tasks been used. 
Although emotion understanding was a significant predictor of change in children's theory-of-
mind task performance, the overall amount of variance accounted for in the models tested was 
relatively small, ranging from 6 to 21%. Thus, there is considerably more to learn about the 
contributors to children's understanding of mental states. One possible avenue for future research 
would be to examine how parent–child discourse about emotions contributes to mental-state 
understanding, or to research how children's interactions with peers relates to later theory-of-
mind development, particularly interactions that involve conflict and differences of opinion. 
Results from this study suggest several avenues for future research. If, in fact, early 
understanding of one's own and others’ emotions forms the foundation for the initial acquisition 
of theory-of-mind understanding, then it is of importance to understand what child and family 
factors, and the transactions between them, contribute to the development of emotion 
understanding. As noted above, another important research focus for future studies is the 
developmental interconnections between understanding of emotions and understanding of 
thoughts, desires, and beliefs; as well as the usefulness of these skills as children negotiate 
increasingly challenging social situations. For example, it may be that children who are more 
advanced in reading others’ desires and emotions are better able to function successfully in the 
kindergarten and first-grade classroom, thus setting them on a trajectory of school success. 
In sum, the present examination of children's understanding of emotions and mental states 
indicates the importance of early emotion knowledge. Continued work on the interrelations 
among emotional and cognitive domains and their combined role in both academic and social 
development of young children will be of value in informing early prevention and intervention 
programmes. 
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